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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE DEFENSE
A lecture delivered by

Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott
at the Naval War College
November 9, 1948

My subject this morning is Economic· Warfare-The De
fense. In particular I �hall address myself to problems concern
ing the defense of the United States and her allies-actual or po
tential-in the present "cold war" and in the event hostilities
break out between this country and Russia.

There appear to be three distinct aspects of this subject
that merit attention. In the first place, there is the protection, in
a physical sense, of the United States and her allies and of the areas
from which they draw essential war materials. In other words,
economic defense of the United States must include defense of more

than the territories within our natural boundaries. There are geo

graphical areas important to us in the light of political and economic
considerations which from the point of view of national interest

must be defended. In the second place, there is the maintenance
and defense of the high level economy which the United States
has maintained since V-J day. The protection of this condition is
necessary, partly for strictly military reasons and partly because

American prosperity is of great political consequence throughout
the world. In the third place, there is the ideological conflict. There
will not be time to say much about this aspect of the problem this
morning. I would, however, like to say at this. point that under
present conditions economic warfare is not simply a "battle for sup
plies," as it was in World Wars I and II. It is also a struggle of
Professor Abbott is Professor of Business Economics at Harvard
University. His lecture entitled "Economic Warfare-The Attack"
appeared in the February issue of "Information Service."
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ideas, of achievements, of two opposed economic systems. In this
ideological struggle, propaganda, which has always been a recog
nized part of economic warfare, will probably play a larger part

than it did in the Second World War.

Since in my lecture a year ago I spoke in some detail regard�
ing the problem of protecting a high level economy, most of my
attention this morning will be devoted to the first aspect of that
problem-the protection of the United States and her allies,. and
particularly of the areas from which they draw supplies.
Before examining particular facets of the problem it may
be helpful if I give some of the background of my thinking on this
whole general subject. It would appear that in the event of hos

tilities many of our actual needs, political and economic, may not
be greatly different from the needs of the Second World War, but

the measures needed to satisfy them I presume might differ ap
preciably.
As regards supplies, it seems likely that the types and per
haps the amounts of strategic and critical materials which we might
need would not be greatly dissimilar to our requirements in the last

war, although I would hope that the Emergency Shipping Priority

List might be trimmed somewhat. One very interesting estimate
that has come to my attention since my last talk, which was based
on the resources available in areas one might expect would be
controlled respectively by the United States and by the U. S. S. R.,
suggests that our chief shortages in the event of hostilities would
be mercury, bauxite, manganese, and oil. I may add that this same
estimate indicated that the chief shortages of the Soviets would
likely be nickel, tin, copper and lead, tungsten, and of course, oil.
Satisfaction of our needs will of course require the control
of the sea lanes. While sea power might not be as useful for the
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blockade of Russia as it was for Germany, it nevertheless would be
of the highest importance-in order to assure this country and
allied areas of a steady flow of supplies, in order to support ad
vance bases from which attacks against Russia might be mounted,
such as British East Africa and Cyprus, and in order to restrict
the movement of enemy agents and of persons capable of induc
ing subversive movements. I make this last point in full recog
nition of the fact that the development of the airplane and the sub
marine has made restrictions of the movements of enemy agents
far more difficult than formerly.
In the last war the phrase "Western Hemisphere Defense"
was one of the common cliches. It has been suggested that in the
event of hostilities we would probably have to add "Security of
the North Atlantic Community" to this former objective, and I
presume, the economic and military defense of other areas as
well. Certainly the maintenance of relative economic stability in
Latin America would be essential, partly because of physical prox
imity, �artly because of the essential foods and raw materials
which we would need to draw from that area. None of these pur
poses, you will observe, can be attained without control of the sea
lanes.
As before, there will probably be a price attached to main
tenance of economic and political stability in the areas important
to us. In its simplest and perhaps its easiest form this price may be
merely the extension of various- kinds of dollar loans . and credits.
It is more likely, however, that the price will consist of things
that these areas will want from us: shipping f:!pace, scarce materials,
manufactured goods, and so on. It seems to me altogether prob
able that the servicing by us of some so-called minimum standard
of economic and business needs will be the price-if not of friend
ship, at least of political and economic conditions that serve our in
terest. Iceland presumably will want hay, fertilizer, agrfoutural
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machinery, and manufactured goods; the East Coast of South

America will want newsprint, coal, and steel; South Africa will

want railroad cars and mining machinery, as well as silk stockings,

toilet paper, and dry cereals; Canada will want fats and oils, es

pecially peanut butter.

To push this thinking one step further,

I would guess that Canada might ask not only for supplies but also

for the maintenance in Latin America of outlets for her pulp,
newsprint, and other products.

I can readily conceive that the price of stability in certain

colonial areas may be the purchase of entire crops or outputs of

raw materials, conceivably even at premium prices. Some of these

commodities may be needed in their entirety, but it is not realistic
to think that we will be so lucky actually as to want all of them.

In the last war the loss of the European market made the entire

copper output of South America available to us and, as you know,
it was bought here.

The Metals Reserves Corporation alone in the

four years ending Novembr 1, 1944, bought $400,000,000 of South

American copper.

Fortunately we needed this item, and it was

available to us .. Maintenance of the Chilean economy, however, in
a style somewhat better than that to which it was accustomed, was
a fortunate by-product.

I can readily conceive of this situation

being reversed, so that the maintenance of the Chilean, or the
South African, or the East African economy through commodity

purchases might become the prime objective, and the acquisition
of commodities a somewhat embarrassing by-product of the policy.

The ability of our adversaries to frustrate these objectives

will certainly be of a. somewhat different character and may be of

somewhat larger dimensions than was the case in the Second World

War.

The mechanisms of economic penetration at the service of

the Russians, which they are using and will use, are quite dissim-

ilar to those of the Nazis.

There will not, presumably, be the prob-

lem of enemy-owned business concerns and trade connectio:ns, at
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least not on the same scale. There is no' Russian counterpart to the
I. G. Farbenindustrie. The problem of hidden or "cloaked" en
emy assets will be of much smaller p�oportions. On the other hand,
it is doubtful if the Nazis ever commanded a fifth column of the pro
portions of the Communist party and its sympathizers; the problem

of loyalty, with its many ramifications, will be far more severe.
In terms of the specific measures of economic warfare and penetra
tion with which we shall have to contend, it is probably safe to
assume that the amount of competitive buying of scarce materials

in neutral markets will be reduced. While it may be ventured
that the Russians have an adequate supply of gold to use as a means

of payment in competitive buying, I would assume that they might
be severely handicapped through lack of an effective world-wide

network of trade connections. As far as I can determine, a system

of trading relations and established commercial connections are
almost if not quite as important for competitive or preclusive
buying as is an adequate supply of the means for payment.
Against this background of thinking we may now consider

in more detail two of the aspects of the problem which I mentioned
at the outset: maintenance of political and economic stability in

areas important to the national interest of the United States,
and preservation of a high level economy in this country.

I shall not try to designate with any precision the areas
which it will be important for us to defend. The forces that
will determine these areas, however, are reasonably clear. There
will be the countries which are our allies; there will be the
interests of military strategy; there will be the areas from which
we have to draw our essential supplies; a,nd particularly there will
be the areas from which our Allies will have to draw their essential
supplies. For example, the Argentine will be of more importance
to Great Britain than to us because of the United Kingdom's de
pendence upon Argentine beef, although this country will no doubt

also need Argentine linseed and quebracho.
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Evidently if we are to receive aid from these areas or give

it to them, control of the means of transportation and communica
tion will be essential. Maintenance of our position will be depend
ent upon supremacy on the sea.

While such control may be of

less offensive significance than in the first two World Wars, its de
fensive significance will be greater and, consequently, the threat
of submarine attack may be of even larger moment.

We can anticipate that economic attacks against our inter

ests in "our" areas will be made.

In general I suspect that the

attacks will not be through what we might call "recognized" in

struments

of economic

warfare-blockade,

trade agreements,

preclusive buying, and so forth-but will be intended to disrupt

the smooth functioning of the productive process and the flow of
trade.

On the whole, it does not appear that Russia will be able to

use effectively the recognized types of economic pressure; but she

has at her disposal other means for accomplishing the same ends.
Let me be more explicit.

In the first two World Wars the United States and the

United Kingdom employed shipping controls and preclusive buy

ing to cut off supplies from Central European powers. A civil
disturbance in South America, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, or
Malaya, sponsored by Moscow, could be used for much the same
purpose-to cut off supplies from the United States or the United

Kingdom.

This country and Great Britain have in the past used
commodity purchase agreements to shape the economy of neutral

and also colonial areas in such a way as to assist our war programs. Our interest at the present time and in the· future will lie
in the maintenance of political stability and a continued production

of necessary materials in these areas. The Russians are quite
capable of various types of operation designed to thwart our in-

terests which is the same as saying that they have methods of
shaping the economic processes in these areas to t:heir purpose.
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Strikes, sabotage, political unrest, inflation, or any other operation
that reduces production or disturbs the normal tenor of business
will serve the Russian .purpose, much as commodity purchase agree
ments have served the purpose of this country and of Great Britain
in the past. I make this point notwithstanding the fact that Rus
sia is using trade agreements with her European satellites much as
if she were a capitalistic power. In the last war we lost control of
Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines through
Japanese conquest. If in these areas Communist or nationalistic
movements sponsored by Moscow should spread, I can conceive that
we might lose their resources almost as fully as if we had lost con
trol of the areas themselves. It does not take great imagination
to see that strikes in key industries and stoppage in key plants
can have much the same effect on production as if those indus
tries and plants were the object of strategic bombing. I was
interested to observe that the November 1st issue of TIME carried
a story to the effect that the coal strike in France was a political
maneuver aimed at hampering the Marshall Plan and European
recovery. The current strike of longshoremen in this country in
itially had the effect of permitting us to supply· Alaska only by an
air lift, and of putting extreme pressure on Hawaii; latterly it
has had the effect of constricting shipments to Western Europe
under the Marshall Plan.
My conclusion may seem far-fetched, but I cannot see why
an effort could not be made through a world-wide movement, partly
Communistic and partly nationalistic, in colonial areas, to cut off
the highly industrialized, raw material importing portions of the
globe from supplies that are produced in those areas. There is
already trouble in greater or lesser degree in Southeast Asia, the
Near East, the Far East, and West Africa. Other parts of the
world, such as North Africa and certain sections of Latin America,
are clearly susceptible to this type of penetration. If such an ef-
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fort were combined with strikes and sabotage in key areas, notably
in docks, harbors, and the maritime industries, it would seem to me

that we might have a reasonable facsimile of a olockade. If, as many
people think, in the next war strategy and operations will neces
sarily be subject to logistics, disturbances in the areas from which
supplies are obtained will come to have a new and a more sinis

ter significance.

While the North American continent is perhaps only mod
erately vulnerable to this type of pressure, it is quite clear that

certain other areas "on our side," notably the United Kingdom
and parts of Western Europe, are distinctly vulnerable. Next to
the coal shortage, probably· the major shortages in Western

Europe and in the low countries are shortages of such imported

items as fertilizers, leather, fibers, fats, and oils. Practically all

of these items are of colonial origin.

It

may seem that I have belabored this point, but I believe

it is of real moment and I wish to give two final examples of what

I mean.

Present plans for European aid assume, I believe, that

by 1951 80 % of Europe's petroleum imports will come from the
Middle East, and that by that date there will be a greatly in

creased volume of European trade across the Iron Curtain.

Clearly the validating of these assumptions depends much more

on Russian action than on ours. It is inconceivable that Russia

could not hamper shipments of petroleum from the Middle East

if she so wished, and certainly the development of east-west trade

in Europe depends directly on her policy.

It follows

of course, that

if these assumptions of the European aid programs are not validated there will be a commensurate increase in the economic

pressure exerted on our economy; at the very least the present
pressure will not be diminished.

The conclusion of this line of thought is that the war po-
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tential of the United States and her allies is most easily attacked
by indirection, and that the area most vulnerable to attack is in the
peripheral sectors of Eurasia and in the colonial territories that
furnish raw material. The kind of attack to be expected, it would
appear, is a combination of measures not ordinarily looked on as
the "orthodox" measures of economic warfare, but which would
have the same purpose and could be highly effective.

To meet this type of attack there are immediately evident
: One is the continuance-or better yet the ex
countermoves
tw<?
tension-of international trade and the present high level of
prosp�rity. The other is stockpiling. I do not intend in this lecture
to try to explore the first of these countermoves, but I do want to
say a little something about stockpiling, and in this term I in

clude offshore stockpiling as well as reserves built up in this
country.
, Stockpiling is of course one of the recognized, classical, or

thodox measures of economic warfare. It is designed to circumvent

the effect of a blockade, or at least to mitigate the effects of a
sudden shortage of essential items. If it is. done on any large
scale it must be done by governmental agencies, partly because
of the amount of money involved (especially if premium prices are
paid), partly because of problems involved in storing and handling,

and partly because utilization of stockpiles must be geared in with
whatever system of allocations and priorities is being employed.

Although the operation must be financed and administered by
government agencies, the operation must be conducted in close
collaboration with industry if it is to be effective.

It may be worth while to quote here some portions of the
"Report on Activities of Metal Reserves Company" for the period
June 28, 1940-November 1, 1944, signed by Charles B. Hender
son, then president of the M. R. C. and chairman of the R. F. C.
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The report covers the period prior to the creation of the United
States Commercial Corporation. According to this report the
M. R. C. contributed to the war effort in four ways:
"It has created stockpiles of metals and minerals that
provide assurance for continued production of military
goods, regardless of possible interruption of supplies."

· "It has assisted in increasing the total volume of metals and
minerals currently flowing into the war effort by making
available to industry, on allocation by the W. P. B., metals
and minerals from sources not available directly to private
industry."
"It has helped to stabilize prices........ by selling at OPA
ceiling prices"-even though it had bought at premium
prices, above OPA ceilings or levels we might consider
"economic."

"It has contributed to the war program by reducing the
strength of the foe through its purchases of supplies
from sources available to unfriendly (later enemy)
powers."
As you know, the M. R. C. was originally set up to stock
pile two commodities, tin and manganese; in the four years of its

operation the list increased to 49. Its transactions covered 51
foreign countries, 31 states of the Union, Alaska, and the Phil

ippines. In addition to buying commodities it paid subsidies to
marginal producers who were thereby enabled to produce and sell
in the ordinary channels of trade at OPA ceiling prices. It set
up subsidiary corporations to operate DPC facilities designed to
produce scarce items. While a substantial number of the stock
pile goals were met 100 % or more, a good many goals were not
attained. Achievement of the goal, of course, does not tell the
whole story of the operation, since sales were continually made
from stockpiles during the period when they were being built up.
I may observe here that some of the audits required of
government corporations under the Corporation Control Act of
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If we are to take these

audits at face value, the stockpiling operation, so far as its book
keeping was concerned, certainly left something to be desired.
If such operations in the future are carried on on a large scale,

here is surely one area where there is considerable room for im-

,·�rovement.

The conclusion that I reach concerning stockpiling is that

a limited amount, designed· to prevent a sudden interruption

in supplies, may be very useful.

But if events develop· in such

a way that more than a moderate stockpile program is urged, or

if substantial reliance is placed on this type of operation, such

circumstances indicate that the economic war under either hot
or cold conditions, is being lost.

Let me turn to the second aspect of the problem which I

mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, the defense of a high
level economy.

In my talk a year ago I took the line. that the

present high level economy in the United States-with its record

breaking national income, its "over-employment," its high tax

receipts, and its large profits-was a fact of great political and

economic consequence throughout the world.

For three years we

have had a most successful economy, more successful than any

one could have hoped for in 1945 and certainly more successful

than the best expectations of many of the "planners"· who fore

cast much lower levels of production and employment.

Except

for price stability we have met all the tests of a successful econ

omy given in the textbooks; we have had full employment and

something more, record-breaking levels of production, a declin
ing debt and burden of taxation, a high level of profits, ail in

creasing volume of capital in".'estment, and a rising standard of

living.

It is this high level economy which makes possible support of
a $40 billion budget and a $250 billion debt, together with the
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enormous "unrequited" exports of which shipments under the
Marshall Plan are only a part. As you know, "unrequited" is
the economists way of describing exports for which you are not
paid. This high level economy has demonstrated to the world the
volume of production possible under a free market economy, avail
able either for armament purposes or for raising the standard of
living of the population. In our "positional war" with the Soviets
this achievement has been something that the Russians undoubt
edly had not counted on.
Unfortunately, a high level economy is a vulnerable econ
omy. It is vulnerable either to a recession or to a final burst of
inflation and speculation that makes a recession inevitable and
more severe than might otherwise be the case. The Russians have
confidently expected and predicted a recession. Should that occur
it would weaken our tax base and our ability to supply raw ma
terials, food, and capital equipment to Europe. It would seriously
compromise the position of the United States on the international
stage, since it would validate the Marxian prophecies.
The Russians could-as could any state with sufficient re
sources and particularly an authoritarian state-undertake from
the outside measures to precipitate either a bust or the final states
of a boom that precede a bust. In my lecture a year ago I
mentioned certain maneuvers that could be undertaken for this
kind of purpose, such as the disorganization of markets for in
ternational commodities, the use of gold shipments for political
purposes, and the falsification or misinterpretation of government
statistics.
The greatest danger, however, I believe lies in the pressures
that can be exerted from the outside in this country on the fed
eral budget, with the consequent repercussions on taxation, spend
ing, and borrowing. I am so thoroughly convinced that the greatest

38
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss3/4

12

Abbott: Economic Warfare - The Defense

RESTRICTED
danger of overstraining the American economy lies here, in the
problem of the big budget, that I vyill not even stop to argue the
case. The methods available to the U.S. S. R. for exerting pressures
in the field of "big government" and "big spending," both in foreign
and domestic fields, are numerous. The implications of these
. pressures are almost· infinite and extend far beyond the limits of
this lecture. They involve not only the whole field of public finance
and fiscal policy, but also a detailed consideration of how our econ
omy works-down to, say, the adequacy of depreciation policies
of individual companies.
I will make only two observations as regards this type of
pressure. Insofar as Russia, in what we may call the area of
"foreign spending", can increase t�e needs for such things as
ERP or European rearmament through political tensions, dis
ruption of trade, diminution of production, or civil disturbance,
the pressure on our economy is increased. This fact is now be
coming generally recognized. On November 4, Edson Smith, the
financial editor of the Boston Herald said: "It is becoming in
creasingly apparent that whether by accident or design the Russian
government is forcing us into a spending program which makes
the achievement of a stable economy at home practically impos
sible." The implications of such a situation, as I have indicated,
are extremely serious.
"The area of domestic spending'' seems to me to fall natur
ally in the orbit of ideological warfare. Insofar as a public opin
ion can be created which demands and expects big government
spending for social security, farm parity prices, grants and aids, '
and so forth, the pressure on our economy will evidently be in
creased. That is, the problem of the "big domestic budget" is es
sentially one of domestic public opinion. If the public wants a
large volume of spending there will be a large budget; if the pub-
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lie does not want such spending the budget . will be small.. The
point of this line of argument, of course, is that public opinion
in a foreign country is exactly what ideological warfare seeks to
influence.
In conclusion let me say that the framework, the setting,
the logics, and the position of economic warfare in the present .
cold war between the United States and the Russians are quite
different from the situation prevailing in either of the first two
World Wars. This is what might be expected on a priori grounds.
The whole geography of the situation is different and it seems
virtually impossible to blockade the Russians.· The U. S. S. R. is
not so highly industrialized a country as Germany and not so
susceptible to shortages of food and raw materials. Nor is it so
dependent on foreign commercial connections and foreign trade.
Consequently it is distinctly less susceptible to offensive measures
of economic warfare, at least of the traditional type, than was
Germany. On the other hand, in view of our logistic and ideological
position, we are more susceptible to offensive measures of economic
warfare than we were heretofore. We are particularly vulnerable
to types of operations that lend themselves to the Russians' abil
ities. This country, at least this country together with her allies,
is very dependent on an even flow of supplies. Our national in
terest lies in the preservation of "normal" economic activity and
economic and political stability. Our interest in such stability is
more intense and will extend over a wider area than was the case
before. As an industrialized, highly integrated, capitalistic na
tion with a delicate and delicately balanced economy, we are
particularly susceptible to the effects of strikes, sabotage, civil
disturbance in colonial areas. Some of these areas are no further
away than Latin America. Ideological warfare evidently has played
and will play a larger part in the situation than it has before. Con
sequently it seems ncessary that more of our efforts should be, and

�I
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will be, spent on defensive operations than on offensive operations
designed to injure the Russian war potential directly. The Mar
shall Plan is a case in point.
Lest this should seem a pessimistic, unaggressive point of
view, I may point out that few things can be so damaging to the
Russian program, or at least large portions of it, as a failure on

their part, because of the excellence of our economic defense, to ac

complish the world wide proletarian revolution they have so con
fidently predicted. They are in the position of having to validate
.a prophecy. If the prophecy is not validated their ideological
position is not likely to stand the disappointment.
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